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INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW PERSPECTIVE
AUSTRALIAN MEDICO-LEGAL ISSUES IN
SPORT: THE VIEW FROM THE
GRANDSTAND*
HAYDEN OPIE**
1. INTRODUCTION
Legal issues in sport are all too often in the news. The centre of attention
is usually a dispute involving a prominent player's contract, an incident of
"ambush marketing" or a power struggle in a major sport such as rugby
league. The commercial flavour of these disputes is pronounced and it is often
claimed that sport and law have come to intersect quite significantly because
sport is nowadays a "business enterprise" and part of the expanding
"entertainment industry."
In the post "Super League" era, it is easy to overlook the important point
that sport is not just about celebrities, money, and power. The building blocks
of sport are the athletes and their bodies, and participation in sport is
encouraged widely as being good for health and personal development.
The medical profession has long recognised the link between health and
sport. There has been much research and comment from a medical perspective
on issues such as:
* rule modification to make sport safer;
" the risk of transmission of infectious diseases;
* exercise and the pregnant woman;
* the use of performance-enhancing drugs; and
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0 sex status.
While the law has become involved increasingly with some of these sports
medicine issues, notably performance-enhancing drugs, there has been no
significant recognition in Australia of the practical and academic importance
of medico-legal issues in sport as a whole, especially from the perspective of
the legal profession. 1 This is a field warranting substantial attention and co-
operation between the medical and legal professions.
This article identifies some areas of medico-legal interest in sport,
comments on selected topical issues, and speculates on their future
development. In doing so, it aims to raise general awareness and stimulate
interest and debate. The overview nature of the article is reflected in the title
by the words, "the view from the grandstand."
2. LIABILITY FOR INJURY
A. Claims Against Sports Medicine Practitioners
Australia has a deserved strong reputation in sports medicine and sports
science. It may be that our international sporting prowess owes much to the
skills of the nation's health care professionals. Sport is an area of expansion
for the practice of the medical arts. Sports medicine appears to be fashionable.
It can be a prominent and rewarding activity. While sports medicine is a
relatively young discipline, it has attained quickly many of the hallmarks of
maturity: in particular, a network of professional bodies and specialist
programs for education and qualification.
With Australian Sports Medicine Federation Ltd. (which now operates
under the name of Sports Medicine Australia) ("SMA"), the nation is served
by a well-established 2 professional association for those interested in the many
disciplines of health care in sport.
The Australasian College of Sports Physicians3 is responsible for
qualifying doctors as sports medicine specialists and acts as a professional
body for doctors working in the field of sports medicine. A university
postgraduate degree program in sports medicine leading to a fellowship is
1. Australia is not alone in this respect. The first major English legal work in the field of sports
medicine and the law appeared only in mid-1999. EDWARD GRAYSON, ETHICS, INJURIES AND THE
LAW IN SPORTS MEDICINE (1999); see also MEDICINE, SPORT AND THE LAW (Simon Payne ed.,
1990) (which has only a modest legal component).
2. Australian Sports Medicine Federation Ltd. was founded in 1963.
3. Australasian College of Sports Physicians, at http://www.acsp.com.au (last visited Sept. 24,
2002).
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available.
A physiotherapist can formally qualify and practice as a "sports
physiotherapist." The universities offer postgraduate qualifications in sports
physiotherapy and the national professional body for physiotherapy, the
Australian Physiotherapy Association, houses a Sports Physiotherapy Group.
Other bodies represent various health professionals working in sports
medicine such as exercise scientists, 4  dietitians, 5  podiatrists, 6  and
psychologists. 7
In summary, the practice of sports medicine has a significant presence in
the Australian health care industry in terms of the number of people treated,
public interest, and institutional structures. Yet, when that is considered
against the backdrop of continuing concern over the level of injury litigation in
the health care industry in general and what should be done about it, it is quite
remarkable that there has been no significant injury litigation in connection
with sports medicine. There appears to be only one resolved court case
attracting mention in the legal literature. In that case a rugby league club
doctor was successful in his defence of a claim that he had negligently
diagnosed and treated a player's injured elbow, causing the player's
professional career to end prematurely.
8
Speculation upon the reasons for this remarkable state of affairs might prove
interesting. Perhaps the standards of care are very high. Is there something in
the culture of sport or in the personal relationship that medical professionals
have with athletes-especially at the elite level-which militates against
litigation?
While the conduct of sports medicine practitioners may not be the object
of litigation, there is another way in which sports medicine could play a role in
sports injury claims.
B. Medical Research and Injury Litigation
Examination of reports in the literature of particular sports injury cases
4. Australian Association for Exercise and Sports Science, at http://www.aaess.com.au (last
visited Sept.24, 2002).
5. Sports Dietitians Australia, at http://www.ausport.gov.au/SDA (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
6. Australian Academy of Podiatric Sports Medicine (no website available. Ph: +61 8 8272
8922).
7. Australian Psychological Society, at http://www.psychsociety.com.au/units/fr-apsunits.htm
(last visited May 2, 2001).
8. Tyrrell v. Gibbs (1997) (N.S.W. Dist. Ct.) No. 1127 of 1994 (unpublished); Tony O'Reilly,
Rugby League Player Fails in Claim Against Club Doctor, ANZSLA NEWSLETTER, Vol. 7, No. 3,
1997, at 7.
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decided by the courts as well as statistics concerning the number of court
actions commenced 9 suggests a significant increase in the level of sports
injury litigation over the past two decades.
Until recently, a feature of this litigation was that it was confined to
incidents where, in a general sense, it might be said that the events had not
proceeded to plan. This encompasses cases of deliberate 10 or careless" 1 injury
of one participant by another, vicarious liability of clubs for the misdeeds of
their employee-players, 12 failure by a referee to enforce the rules, 13 allegation
of negligent medical care,14 lack of safety for spectators 15 and participants 16
by venue managers or activity organisers, and the failure to screen participants
for health risks. 17 In substance, the sports injury cases had been concerned
with what, in the field of product liability law, would be called "production" or
"manufacturing" defects where the product causing injury did not conform to
specification. In product liability law, a manufacturer can be liable also for a
design defect. This occurs where the product is regarded as defective even
though it conforms exactly to the specification. It is the design that is under
challenge and the allegation is that the product design is inherently unsafe.
In sport, it is well known that there may exist inherent risks from either
participation or being a spectator. The nature and extent of the risks will vary
according to the sport. The community tolerates those inherent risks because
they are outweighed by a vrariety of benefits such as recreation, character
building, and improved fitness. Whereas being bumped or accidentally poked
in an eye are risks inherent in basketball or netball, that behaviour is not
tolerated in everyday life away from the sport. There seem to be two limits.
9. Hayden Opie, Sports Associations and Their Legal Environment, in LEGAL ISSUES FOR NON-
PROFIT AssOCIATIONS 74, 87-89 (Myles McGregor-Lowndes et al. eds., 1996).
10. McNamara v. Duncan (1971) 26 A.L.R. 584 (an elbow to the head in Australian Rules
Football is a battery).
11. Rootes v. Shelton (1967) 116 C.L.R. 383 (where a boat driver was negligent when he pulled
a waterskier, blinded by spray, into a stationery obstacle); Johnston v. Frazer (1990) 21 N.S.W.L.R.
89 (where a jockey was negligent when his careless riding caused another jockey's horse to fall).
12. Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League Football Club Ltd. v. Rogers (1993) A. Torts R. 1 81-
246 (where a rugby league club was vicariously liable for battery committed by employee player on
opposing player).
13. Hayden Opie, Referee Liability in Sport: Negligent Rule Enforcement and Smoldon v
Whitworth, 5 TORTS L.J. 17 (1997).
14. Tyrrell, No. 1127 of 1994; O'Reilly, supra note 8, at 7.
15. Austl. Racing Drivers Club Ltd. v. Metcalf (1961) 106 C.L.R. 177.
16. Nowak v. Waverley Mun. Council (1984) A. Torts R. 80-200 (where a rugby league player
broke his foot on a raised sprinkler).
17. Watson v. Haines (1987) A. Torts R. 80-094 (where a schoolboy with a relatively long thin
neck was not removed from "hooker" position in rugby league).
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First, excessively dangerous sports may be illegal, such as prize-fighting and
dueling. Second, there is an obligation under the law of negligence upon the
organisers of sporting activities (including coaches) to ensure that participants
(especially novices) are acquainted with and properly prepared to encounter
the inherent risks of the sport.18 Applying that approach, if a sport participant
is injured by the occurrence of an inherent risk in a lawful sport after being
acquainted with the risks and trained for participation, no person is legally
liable for the injury-it is an accident.
In Agar v. Hyde,19 the High Court of Australia dealt with a novel claim
that has important implications for the role of preventive medicine in sport.
The claim was brought by two rugby union players who, as adult teenagers,
had broken their necks in separate incidents and suffered quadriplegia while
playing the position of "hooker" in interclub competition. 20 The hooker takes
the central place in the front row of a scrum.21 Both had suffered their injuries
when the two sides of the scrum engaged. 22 Their claim was against the
international governing body of the sport of rugby union and alleged that it
owed them a duty of care in negligence to amend the rules to remove
unnecessary risks. 23  This is equivalent to claiming that there is a
responsibility to deal with design defects.
The High Court unanimously rejected the claim. 24 A number of reasons
were given,25 but for present purposes it is sufficient to note that the Court
considered that a person's voluntary participation in a sport would defeat any
claim where the injury was caused by an inherent risk of participation. 26 The
Court appears to have believed that the plaintiffs knew what they were doing
when they participated and they had to take the consequences, no matter how
unfortunate. To reinforce the point, Justice Callinan described the sport of
18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Mount Isa Basketball Ass'n (1997) A. Torts R. 81-451(Association
should have given instructions to inexperienced referee on the risks and dangers of running
backwards); Le Mans Grand Prix Circuits Party Ltd. v. Iliadis (1998) 4 V.R. 661 (where there was
insufficient instruction, experience, and testing to engage in go-kart racing); Robertson v. Hobart
Police & Citizens Youth Club Inc. (1984) A. Torts R. 80-629 (involving a fall from a trampoline,
and failure to give a twelve year-old proper safety instructions for landing).
19. (2000) 201 C.L.R. 552.
20. Id. at 565.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 558-59.
24. Agar, 201 C.L.R. at 552.
25. For a fuller discussion, see Hayden Opie, The Sport Administrator's Charter: Agar v Hyde,
9 TORTS L.J. 131 (2001).
26. Id. The court left open the possibility that a different approach might be taken if the injured
are school-age children or employees.
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rugby union as "notoriously a dangerous game."27
While the Court's reasoning is consistent with the established approach in
relation to responsibility for inherent risks, it did not explore the meaning of that
expression. Had it done so the result may have been different. The incidents
occurred in August 1986 and August 1987, before the introduction in 1988 of
the crouch-touch-pause-engage ("CTPE") sequence for scrum formation that
was intended to reduce the incidence of injuries of the kind suffered by the
plaintiffs. 28 In the years preceding the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, there
had been a growing number of reports and expressions of concern in the medical
and scientific literature about the occurrence of spinal cord injury in rugby
union, especially to players in the front row of scrums. There was debate about
the mechanism of injury and the best measure for reducing the number of
cases.29 The CTPE rule was the outcome.
Sport governing bodies routinely review their sport's rules to assess, inter
alia, issues of safety. Some sports have standing committees of scientific and
coaching experts for this purpose. Rule changes are often the result and may
bring changes in the inherent risks of participation. Notwithstanding the
element of responsibility suggested by the foregoing, the High Court has in
effect held that this is a moral, not a legal, responsibility of sport governing
bodies.30 However, it is difficult to argue that people such as the plaintiffs are in
any real position to assess these emerging risks. They place their trust in the
hands of those who govern the sport to be watchful and responsive to emerging
scientific knowledge of the risks of participation and what can be done about
them.
Unfortunately, the Court's ruling means participants are largely on their
own in terms of protection against "design defects." This runs counter to the
general expansionary development of the tort of negligence over the past
seventy years. Society tolerates avoidable injury less and less. Its cost in human
and financial terms is too great. The trend has been to require those in positions
of power and knowledge to be proactive. Not to impose some legal
responsibility permits a sport's governing body to ignore emerging medical and
scientific evidence of systematic injury and to cocoon the sport's rules within
the traditions of bygone eras.
This is not to suggest that there should be a general legal obligation to
27. Agar, 201 C.L.R. at 600.
28. Opie, supra note 25, at 151.
29. T. Kew et al., A Retrospective Study of Spinal Cord Injuries in Cape Province Rugby
Players, 1963-1989, 80 S. AFR. MED. J. 127, 129 (1991); see also Alan T. Scher, Rugby Injuries to
the Cervical Spine and Spinal Cord: A 10-Year Review, 17 CLINICS IN SPORTS MED. 195 (1998).
30. Agar, 201 C.L.R. at 583-84.
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eliminate risk from sport. Any sporting activity can be made safer by
changing its nature; for instance, by outlawing tackling in the various football
codes. The rule whereby participants bear the legal responsibility for injuries
caused by inherent risks should remain largely intact. However, where the
risk is one known or understood only by a few because it is in the realm of
emerging medical knowledge, it is undesirable for the sport governing body
that has access to that knowledge to have no legal obligation to even consider
rule changes as a protective measure.
By advocating such a limited duty of care in relation to rule changes, there
is no intention to suggest that the -international governing body for rugby union
breached its duty to the plaintiffs. That would have to be decided by a trial court
after consideration of evidence such as the practicality of avoidance measures 31
and the state of medical and scientific knowledge at the time the injuries
occurred.32 It might have been that the new CTPE rule was a reasonable
response to the risk and was implemented as soon as practicable.
For people involved in physical education and sports medicine, the pursuit
of making sport safer is nothing new. There have always been strong practical
and moral reasons for doing so. In the past, there have been instances where
tradition, stubbornness, or ignorance have blocked proposals for rule changes
that would have reduced the risk of injury without threatening the nature of a
sport. Before Agar, it was arguable that legal liability might occur if change
was not pursued. Unfortunately, the High Court in large measure has taken
away that prospect and the incentives for safe behaviour that it carried.
Perhaps sport administrators may now be less likely to encourage research by
sports medicine professionals into the extent and causes of injuries in their
sports and to give those professionals a voice in deciding rule changes. The
High Court's ruling may be a setback to the cause of injury avoidance in sport.
3. INFECTIOus DISEASES
The announcement in November 1991 by U.S. professional basketball
player Earvin "Magic" Johnson that he had contracted HIV drew considerable
public attention to the issue of infectious diseases in sport. 33 In January 1992,
31. This is part of the Court's inquiry into the "calculus of negligence," whereby the magnitude
of the harm and its chance of occurrence are weighed against the cost and difficulty of avoidance
measures and the call of conflicting responsibilities. Council of the Shire of Wyong v. Shirt (1980)
146 C.L.R. 40,47-48.
32. Roe v. Minister of Health (1954) 2 Q.B. 66; see also Rosenberg v. Percival (2001) 178
A.L.R. 577, 593.
33. Roger S. Magnusson & Hayden Opie, HIV and Hepatitis in Sport: A Legal Framework for
Resolving Hard Cases, 20 MONASH U. L. REv. 214 (1994).
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an international furore occurred when some Australian basketball players
expressed their misgivings at the prospect of playing against Johnson at that
year's Olympic Games in Barcelona.34
Concern about infectious diseases in sport is not confined to HIV. From a
medical perspective, Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C arguably present more
serious public health problems. From a legal perspective, these three diseases
produce a potent cocktail of issues, including confidentiality, liability for
injury, breach of contract, anti-discrimination law, and restraint of trade.
These issues were considered at length in a 1994 study.35
An important aspect of anti-discrimination law and infectious diseases in
sport is whether, and in which circumstances, a person who has an infectious
disease, such as HIV, may be excluded from participation. Under, for
instance, Australian federal legislation, it is unlawful to exclude a person from
a sporting activity on the ground of a disability. 36 A disability includes the
presence in the body of organisms causing or capable of causing disease or
illness. 37 However, where the person's disability is a disease, discrimination
is not unlawful if it is "reasonably necessary to protect public health. '38
In the 1994 study, it was strongly recommended that sports adopt and
follow a policy of infection control along the lines advocated by SMA. 39 That
policy would address issues such as the handling of blood spills (including
having a "blood-bin" rule40) and general hygiene. 41 On the other hand, it was
noted that there had been "isolated, reported examples of HIV transmission
following a collision on a soccer field, which caused severe skin wounds with
copious bleeding and following a fist fight at a wedding, which caused facial
injuries with profuse bleeding." 42
However, the report of transmission on the soccer field has been
34. Id.
35. Id; see also Roger S. Magnusson & Hayden Opie, Legal Issues Arising from HIV and
Hepatitis in Sport, 12 SPORT HEALTH 3 (1994).
36. Disability Discrimination Act, 1992, § 28(1) (Austl.) (hereinafter "Disability Act").
37. Id. § 4(1).
38. Id. § 48.
39. Magnusson & Opie, supra note 33, at 269.
40. A "blood-bin" rule requires that a bleeding player be removed from the field of play until the
flow of blood is controlled and the wound is securely covered. The Australian National Council on
AIDS, Hepatitis C and Related Diseases has gone further and, controversially, issued a suggested
guideline advising that "any player sent from the field under the 'blood rule' on more than one
occasion should not be allowed back onto the field during the remainder of the game." HIV, Hepatitis
and Other Blood Born Viruses and Sport, ANCAHRD BULL., Bulletin 19,2000, at 3.
41. Magnusson & Opie, supra note 33, at 269.
42. Id. at 218.
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questioned in the scientific literature.43 The authors of the 1994 study also
noted that "[a]n outbreak of Hepatitis B amongst Swedish cross-country
runners was.., thought to have resulted from competitors cutting and grazing
themselves as they navigated untracked woodland, leaving blood adhering to
the scrub, which later competitors grazed against, and by communal bathing at
the finish line." 44
Later in the 1994 study, it was stated:
[I]t is clear that the initial risk of transmission [of HIV, Hepatitis B
and Hepatitis C] from collisions and blows occurring in combat and
contact sports cannot be eliminated by, "after-the-event" procedures
such as the "blood-bin" rule. Thus, if it could be shown that blood
spillage, body contact, and reciprocal blood contact during the sport
were sufficiently frequent,... [it might be] reasonable to exclude
infected players from the sport. It is'suggested that the public health
exception could well apply to combat sports such as wrestling, boxing
and some martial arts, and possibly to rugby union and [rugby] league,
in view of the high incidence of . lacerations requiring medical
attention .... [H]owever, the risk of bloody contact between players
must be distinguished from the risk of disease transmission, and the
[Human Rights and Equal Opportunity] Commission might well
uphold an athlete's right to participate in sport despite a theoretical
risk, in the absence of stronger evidence of collision or blow-
associated infection transmission. The issue is difficult to predict.4
5
The 1994 study concluded with the observation that the application of the
relevant legal doctrines would be influenced by the scientific evidence and that
evidence was still emerging.46
In April 1999, the validity of the exclusion of an Australian Rules football
player from a prominent amateur league came before the Victorian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal ("the Tribunal")"in Hall v. Victorian Amateur
Football Ass 'n.47 Hall was HIV positive but in "extremely good health. 48
He reported his condition to his club president who, with Hall's consent,
43. Id.
44. Id. at 219.
45. Id. at 259.
46. Id. at 268.
47. (1999) E.O.C. 92-997; see also Judy Bourke, HIVFootballer Wins Discrimination Case, 11
SPORT EDUCATOR 30 (1999); Gaethan Cutri, A Testing Case for the AFL, 74 L. INST. J. 61 (2000);
Angelo Veljanovski, Discrimination-HIV Positive Sportsperson Seeking to Play Australian
Football, 7 SPORT & L.J. 66 (1999).
48. Hall, E.O.C. 1 92-997 at 79,360.
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reported it to the Victorian Amateur Football Association ("VAFA"). 49 The
VAFA refused to register Hall as a player.50 That meant he could not play for
his club in matches controlled by the VAFA. The reason for the refusal was
stated to be Hall's HIV status. 51 The Executive of the VAFA passed the
following resolution: "That Mr Hall's application for registration be refused
on the ground that the rejection is necessary in order to protect the health and
safety of other registered players engaged in the competition conducted by the
Association." 52
Hall alleged he was the victim of direct discrimination53 on the ground of
impairment54 contrary to section 65 of the Equal Opportunity Act, 1995. Hall
lodged a complaint with the Victorian Equal Opportunity Commission and it
referred the complaint to the Tribunal. Section 65 provides:
A person must not discriminate against another person -
(a)...
(b) by excluding the other person from participating in a sporting
activity. 55
Before the Tribunal the VAFA conceded that its refusal to register Hall
was direct discrimination on the ground of impairment within the meaning of
section 65.56 However, it relied upon section 80 that confers a general
exception:
80(1) A person may discriminate against another person on the basis
of impairment ... if the discrimination is reasonably necessary -
(a) to protect the health or safety of any person.., or of the public
generally. 57
The case turned on whether the ban upon Hall was "reasonably necessary"
to protect other players who may play with or against him or train with him.
58
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, §§ 7-8 (VICT. STAT.).
54. Id. (defines discrimination by reference to certain "attributes" that are listed in section 6 of
the Act). "Impairment" is listed as an "attribute" by section 6(b). In section 4 of the Act, one of the
categories of "impairment" is "(b) the presence in the body of organisms that may cause disease." Id.
55. Id. § 65(b).
56. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,360.
57. Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 80(1)(a).
58. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,360.
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The onus of proof in this respect rested with the VAFA. 59
The Tribunal knew of no other ruling that had considered the meaning in
the legislation of the words "reasonably necessary" and found observations
upon similar words in other contexts to be unhelpful. 60  Therefore, it
interpreted the words according to the words' purpose and their "nature and
ordinary meaning." 61 The Tribunal held that:
[T]he conduct... must, in all the circumstances, be reasonably
necessary (that is, on a reasonable judgment) to protect the health and
safety of the class which the ban is designed to protect. The test is not
an absolute test. The ban need not be necessary in absolute terms, but
must, on a reasonable judgment, be necessary for the specified
purpose. Parliament has not used the words "reasonable" or
"desirable" for the specified purpose. It has used the words
"reasonably necessary." The test is an objective one.62
The Tribunal then said that the belief of the VAFA as to what was
reasonably necessary, and what inquiries it had made before instituting the
ban, were relevant factors. 63 However, these are subjective factors and it is
difficult to understand this assertion given that the Tribunal held the test to be
objective. 64 While the Tribunal held that the VAFA had a "genuine belief that
the ban was reasonably necessary and that such belief was based on
information reasonably obtained by it,' 65 the Tribunal's analysis does not shed
light upon why it considered these subjective factors to be relevant to deciding
the issue of what was "reasonably necessary." 66
The Tribunal proposed a form of risk analysis to determine whether the
ban was reasonably necessary. It stated seven questions to be answered. 67 In
essence, these questions involved the Tribunal balancing the following
considerations against each other:
* the definition and size of the class to be protected;
" the risk to be protected against, the likelihood of the risk
occurring, and the gravity of the risk if it materialises;
* the effectiveness of the ban in guarding against the risk;
59. Id.
60. Id at 79,361.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,361-62.
64. Id. at 79,361.
65. Id. at 79,369.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 79,362.
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* whether the ban carries with it any risk to the class to be
protected;
* existing protective measures and the extent to which, if any, -the
ban will increase protection;
* non-discriminatory alternatives to the ban and their practicality;
and
* the beliefs of the VAFA referred to above. 68
The Tribunal concluded that the risk to other players by Hall playing
football in the VAFA was "so low"69 that it was not reasonably necessary to
ban him and held that he had been discriminated against.
70
Substantial epidemiological and actuarial evidence was presented to the
Tribunal as to the likelihood of transmission of HIV. 71 The focus of this
evidence was on the chance of contracting HIV through a collision or other
impact producing a bleeding injury. 72 One source estimated that where a
player known to be HIV infected is participating on a regular basis, and
another player plays twenty games with that infected player, there is a one in
six thousand chance of contracting HIV. 73  This estimate was built on
assumptions about the number of contacts per game and rates of occurrence of
bleeding injuries.74 Other evidence placed the risk much lower, in one case as
low as 1 in 125 million. 75 Importantly, the Tribunal stated, "[t]he calculation
of statistical risk cannot be divorced from other evidence before us that there is
no clearly established case of transmission of HIV occurring in consequence
of playing any code of football anywhere in the world."
76
As the 1994 study mentioned above noted, and as is clear from the
Tribunal's ruling, the statistical estimates are speculative. 77  Also,
notwithstanding an increasing number of cases of HIV infection worldwide,
the absence of any relevant reported cases of transmission since the 1994
study weakens the strength of the case for banning infected players.
Hall argued that banning him would be detrimental to public health and
68. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,362.
69. Id. at 79,369.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 79,362-79,363.
72. Id. at 79,362.
73. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,363.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 79,364.
77. Id. at 79,362-64.
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safety.78 It would only cause other HIV positive players not to reveal their
condition and discourage them "from seeking assessment or treatment. 79
Also, if the VAFA was permitted to ban him, Hall argued that the VAFA
would be lulled into a false sense of security leading to insufficient vigilance
in other measures having a significant role in preventing the spread of
infection. 80 The Tribunal rejected these arguments, claiming that the evidence
offered in support of them was "highly speculative. '" 81
The VAFA argued that if Hall was permitted to play, it would be faced
with very onerous obligations from its insurers. 82  Evidence from an
underwriting agency as to what would be its requirements was presented. 83
Some requirements were criticised by medical witnesses and one requirement
in particular was considered "grossly unreasonable." 84  The Tribunal
concluded that the requirements were based upon inadequate information and
inquiry and dismissed the VAFA's argument. 85
Rather than ban Hall, .the important consideration according to the
Tribunal was that the VAFA follow its own Infectious Diseases Policy.86 This
required the adoption of procedures recommended by the SMA. Evidence
suggested that the VAFA had not been sufficiently diligent in implementing its
Policy. 87  It was appropriate that the Policy's procedures be followed
irrespective of whether Hall was playing and, if followed, represented the most
significant manner in which the risk of infection (not just of HIV, but hepatitis,
as well) could be reduced. 88
Shortly after the Tribunal gave its ruling, the VAFA consented to orders
that it register Hall as a player in its competition and that it be restrained from
committing further breaches of section 65 in relation to him.89 Hall also
applied for an order concerning the formulation and implementation of various
educational programmes by the VAFA. That application was referred to
78. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,360.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 79,368.
83. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,368.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 79,369.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Hall, E.O.C. 92-997 at 79,369.
89. Hall v. Victorian Amateur Football Ass'n (Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal), No.
153 of 1998 (unreported).
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mediation and resolved successfully. 90
Hall sought the award of various damages and costs.91 The Tribunal
delivered its ruling on December 10, 1999, and in large measure rejected these
claims.92 Of interest was a claim for damages for loss of opportunity to play
football and for loss of privacy in relation to Hall's HIV status. 93 Hall failed
to prove that he suffered a loss of opportunity to play football. 94 He was
impeded by an injury and did not train with the same regularity afterwards.
Also, the team with which he usually played was promoted and it was not
clear that he would have been selected to play even if not banned. As for the
publicity given to Hall's HIV status, the first public mention of the case came
from Ian Collins, a Commissioner of the Australian Football League ("AFL"),
at a sports medicine conference in Melbourne. 95  This appears to have
occurred without the prior knowledge of the VAFA. Collins had become
aware of the issue because the VAFA had asked the AFL whether it had ever
encountered a similar case. 96 Without identifying Hall or the competition,
Collins mentioned that a person with HIV was seeking to play football in
Victoria.97 This prompted the news media to 'approach many Victorian
football clubs seeking to identify the player and the competition. Later, Hall
was interviewed on television in The Footy Show on Channel 9.98 The
Tribunal considered that the VAFA was not responsible for the publicity and
declined to award damages for loss of privacy. 99
Compared with the range and complexity of legal issues that the 1994
study considered relevant to the question of infectious diseases in sport, the
Hall case raised only a narrow, albeit very important, issue. Nothing was in
dispute concerning liability for injury, restraint of trade, breach of contract or
other applications of anti-discrimination law. On the present scientific
evidence the decision seems correct, perhaps unsurprising. The widespread
publicity and acceptance that the decision appears to have attracted may serve
as a useful educational exercise.
The law has a complex, but identifiable, legal framework to deal with
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 7.
94. Hall, No. 153 of 1998 at 8.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 9.
99. Hall, No. 153 of 1998 at 9.
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cases of infectious diseases in sport. However, its application is dependent on
the evolving state of medical knowledge. On the medico-legal front, there is
more work to be done in expanding medical understanding of the transmission
risks of infectious diseases so that the law can be invoked with more certainty.
Also, more work needs to be done on educating sports administrators and
lawyers on the interaction of law and medicine in this area.100 Better past
efforts in these respects may have meant that Hall's case need never have
happened.
4. THE PREGNANT ATHLETE
Prior to perhaps the past two decades, it was customary for a pregnant
woman to cease sport once she learned she was pregnant. However, that is no
longer the case. Improved medical knowledge of the risks and benefits of
physical activity for pregnant women, together with changing social attitudes,
have seen pursuit of sporting activities well into pregnancy. There are
numerous reports of elite female athletes participating in Olympic Games and
other major international and national sports events while as much as three
months pregnant. 101
SMA has prepared information concerning the benefits and risks of
participation in exercise and sport by the pregnant athlete. 102 These will vary
according to the health of the individual athlete, the stage of pregnancy, and the
activity to be undertaken. As a result of such educational activities, not only are
women more likely to continue with sport because they better understand the
risks involved, but they are often encouraged to do so for their own health.
These advances in medical knowledge and associated social developments
have created a new dimension for interaction between sports medicine and the
law: liability for injury to mother and foetus and questions surrounding the
human rights of pregnant women. The practical relevance of such issues can be
seen in recent moves to ban pregnant women from Australia's major women's
sport, netball. 103
The medical management of the pregnant athlete may involve:
0 providing her with sufficient information about the desirability of
100. For instance, it is suggested that the discussion by Cutri of possible transmission of HIV in a
sporting context inadequately considers the medical evidence, overstates the risk and is alarmist.
Cutri, supra note 47, at 61-63.
101. Stephen Cauchi, Netball Body Orders Pregnant Pause Over Risks and Legalities, THE AGE
(Melbourne), June 19, 2001, at 1.
102. ExERCISE IN PREGNANCY, WOMEN N SPORT FACT SHEET NO. 2 (Sports Medicine Australia
2000).
103. Cauchi, supra note 101.
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exercise for health and the associated risks;
* monitoring the health of the pregnant athlete (diagnosis) as the
pregnancy progresses; and
* recommending that she refrain from certain activities at certain
stages of the pregnancy.
Each of these factors has a corresponding legal dimension:
* There may be a failure to provide information about risks, the
woman then participates in exercise or sport, and the woman or
foetus is injured;
* An error in assessing the woman's health may be made, the woman
is cleared to participate, and the woman or foetus is injured; and
* If a woman does not accept advice against participating, can she be
excluded from participation, and who might be liable to the foetus
should it be injured?
An injury to the woman in either of the first two sets of circumstances could
be expected to involve a relatively conventional instance of alleged liability in
negligence arising from the doctor/patient relationship. Injury to the foetus
raises more unusual or problematic issues.
Subject to the comments below about a mother's possible liability, it is
clearly established that a foetus injured in the womb and subsequently born alive
has legal rights against the person Who injured it if the circumstances of the
injury's infliction are wrongful.104 Practically, such a legal claim is often
initiated by a parent on the child's behalf in order to meet the immediate need to
pay for medical expenses and additional costs incurred in caring for a disabled
person. Alternatively, upon reaching adult age, the injured person may initiate
the claim. 105
There has been no reported case in Australia where such a claim has arisen
out of a sports context. However, as a matter of legal principle, claims in
certain circumstances might be open. The claim could be against:
* the mother's doctor;
* the organisers of the sports event at which the foetus is injured (this
might also include the sports association, the mother's club, or the
mother's coach); and
* a fellow participant at the event who caused the injury (this might
include the umpires or referees).
104. Watt v. Rama [1972] V.R. 353; Xv. Pal (1991) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 26.
105. Usually, this must occur within three (e.g., Limitation Act, 1969, §§ 11(3), (52) (N.S.W.
ACTS)) or six years (e.g., Limitation of Actions Act, 1958, §§ 3(2), 23(1) (VICT., STAT.)) of attaining
adulthood.
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Also, any claim would face the potentially difficult hurdle in establishing a
causal link between the incident on the sports field and the harm suffered by the
foetus-harm that may not necessarily be identified until some considerable
time after birth.
In exploring the basis of these potential claims, it must be recognised that
there is an absence of specific precedent to act as a guide, and even the possible
application of higher principles must be viewed with a degree of uncertainty as
to the outcome. However, the exercise is not one of pointless speculation.
Recent events in the women's sport of netball, supported by interest from
basketball, cricket, and hockey, demonstrate that concern over potential liability
for injury to the unborn can lead to bans on the participation of pregnant women
calculated to produce confrontation with the nation's anti-discrimination
laws. 106
The mother's doctor could be liable for not providing sufficient
information to the mother about the risks of participation, or for making a
negligent recommendation for the mother to participate should either result in
injury to the foetus. The occasion for legal responsibility arises from the
doctor/patient relationship involving the treatment of the mother.10 7 In any
event, it is established that the doctor owes a duty to take reasonable care for
the safety of the foetus. 10 8 Interesting questions might arise if the doctor
recommended strongly against participation, but the mother indicated her
intention to ignore that recommendation. For instance, is the doctor at liberty
to report these matters to the other parent or some regulatory authority? This
* question raises complex general issues of confidentiality and the rights of the
.unborn that go beyond the scope of this paper. However, the doctor's advice
to the mother and her response will usually be confidential communications.
Whether the doctor can break the confidence and rely on the "public interest"
exception is problematic. 109 This might require weighing the public interest in
protecting the strength of doctor/patient confidentiality against the interest in
the health and welfare of the foetus. While the common law has accorded
rights to claim compensation for injury caused by third parties should the
106. See Gardner v. Nat'l Netball League Pty Ltd. (2001) 182 A.L.R. 408 (where a pregnant
athlete obtained an injunction to prevent her exclusion from playing netball).
107. A failure to provide a pregnant woman with sufficient information to enable her to minimise
risks to her foetus from participation in sport is analogous to the duty of care owed by a doctor to the
sexual partner of a patient when the patient exhibits symptoms of HIV. That duty requires the doctor
to counsel the patient to be tested for HIV. BT v. Oei (1999) N.S.W.S.C. 1082 (unreported).
108. Pal, 23 N.S.W.L.R. at 43-44.
109. Magnusson & Opie, supra note 33, at 244-49 (discussing the principles governing this
exception to confidentiality generally and'in connection with revealing a patient's infectious disease
status).
2002]
130 AUSTRALIAN MEDICO-LEGAL ISSUES [Vol. 13:113
foetus be born alive, the courts have been reluctant to intervene in the course
of a pregnancyI10 and, as discussed below, are yet to hold a mother generally
liable for causing injury to her unborn child. Thus, there would seem to be
little purpose in the doctor breaking the confidence, and a public interest
exception might therefore not be recognised.
The organisers of a sporting activity who are aware or ought to be aware of
a woman's pregnancy could be liable to the foetus (if subsequently born alive)
for failing to provide sufficient information to the mother about the risks of
participation, thereby endangering the foetus. The basis of this claim is the duty
of care falling on organisers of sporting events to warn participants of risks of
the activity. This is especially so for novice participants. While there is no
reported court ruling on the issue, the duty's existence would be uncontroversial
in many instances. For instance, SMA guidelines recommend against any
woman participating in scuba diving, novice downhill skiing, ice skating, or
horse riding if she knows or suspects she is pregnant.IlI An organiser of such
activities might be expected to bring the content of this recommendation to the
attention of female participants of child-bearing age. On the other hand, a risk
to a pregnant woman may be so obvious that a warning is unnecessary.
As discussed above, participation in sport carries with it inherent risks of
injury, especially in combat, contact, and collision sports. The legal
consequences of those risks fall on the participants. Nevertheless, all participants
have established legal duties under the law relating to battery and negligence to
avoid injuries to others. Again, given the existence of these legal obligations
and the established position generally in relation to liability for causing injury to
unborn children, there would seem to be no reason why a fellow participant of
the mother's could not be liable to an injured foetus subsequently born alive. It
may be that even to participate in a sport with a woman who is pregnant may
amount to negligence if the foreseeable and inherent physical contacts of the
sport represent a danger to the foetus.
Difficult questions may arise if it is claimed on behalf of the injured foetus
110. In addition to an entrenched absence of legal personality accorded to a foetus at common
law, this reluctance is evident in a number of respects: A husband has no right on behalf of the
unborn child to prevent his wife who is pregnant by him from having an abortion. C v. S (1988) 1
Q.B. 135; In the Marriage ofF (1989) 96 Fain. L. R. 118. A court has no authority to make an unborn
child a ward of the court. Re F (in utero) (1988) 2 All E.R. 193. It is unlawful to force a mother to
undergo a Caesarean section against her will even though it was necessary to save her own and her
foetus' health and life from real danger. St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust v. S (1998) 3 All E.R.
673, 692. It is unlawful to forcibly detain a woman to prevent her sniffing glue and causing serious
harm to her foetus. Winnipeg Child & Family Serv. v. G [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925.
111. Dr. Marg Torode, Participation of the Pregnant Athlete in Contact and Collision Sports,
SPORTS MEDICINE AUSTRALIA GUIDELINES (May 1994), available at
http://www.ausport.gov.au/sma/images/torode/pdf.
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subsequently born alive that the organisers should have excluded the pregnant
athlete, or fellow participants should have imposed a boycott. Both actions
could amount to illegal discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 112 It might be
an answer to a negligence claim to say that the organisers and fellow
participants behaved reasonably by obeying anti-discrimination laws. However,
sometimes the standard of reasonable care dictates breaching the law1 13 and
there is no guarantee that organisers or participants could safely stand behind the
screen of compliance with anti-discrimination law. Hopefully, appropriate
entreaties and information about risks directed to the pregnant woman will
remove danger in those cases that might otherwise invite negligence liability.
A claim might be brought against the mother by:
* the child upon reaching adulthood;
* the other parent on behalf of the child, pointedly so if relations
between the parents have soured; and
* any other person sued by or on behalf of the child where such
person seeks contribution from the mother (any such claim for
contribution is dependent upon the mother owing her unborn child a
duty of care).
Whether a mother might owe her unborn child a duty of care in relation to
participating in physical activities like sport is controversial. The starting point
for most commentaries is the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal
in Lynch v. Lynch.114 Upon the basis of this authority it has been asserted or
implied a number of times that a mother owes her unborn child a duty of care
when participating in sport. The following is an example:
In the case Lynch v Lynch (1991) a child successfully sued her mother
for pre-natal injury claiming that the action of her mother was
negligent. This case arose out of a motor vehicle accident, but the
same argument may be used where a child is born with injuries
resulting from the mother's involvement in sport. The court said that
112. See, e.g., Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, § 7 (Austl.) (although not all sporting activities
may fall within the Act's scope-provision of services and facilities (§ 22) and clubs (§ 25) are the
sections most likely to be applicable); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, pt. 3 (N.S.W. STAT. ACTS);
Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, §§ 6(h),7,8 & 65; Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 80(2) (permitting
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy where reasonably necessary to protect the health or safety of
any person including the mother). While at common law a foetus is not a "person" until born, it could
be argued that banning the mother is for her own safety (aside from the safety of her foetus or because
they are one).
113. It has been suggested in the context of the relationship between negligence and compliance
with the road traffic rules that, "[c]ircumstances may be conceived in which obedience to the
regulations may as a matter of prudence be the very worst course to take, e.g. where to disobey may
avoid injury or save life." Tucker v. McCann [1948] V.L.R. 222, 225.
114. (1991)25 N.S.W.L.R. 411.
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a child can sue because there is a duty of care owed to the unborn
child, and that this duty can be breached by pre-natal neglect or
carelessness causing injury. There is no parental immunity. This
means that a pregnant woman is personally responsible for her health
and that of her unborn child. 115
While the Court of Appeal held a mother liable for the injury she caused to
her foetus in a motor vehicle accident, to state that the same argument may be
used in relation to sport (with the implication that it would succeed) overstates
the position.116 The court was invited to decide in favour of the defendant
mother on grounds of public policy on the basis that if she was not exempt
from the duty, it would place her every act or omission between conception
and birth under public scrutiny and analysis. 117 In particular, the possibility of
the mother being held liable for injury to the foetus by "engaging in
competitive sports, or in dangerous activities such as absailing" 118 was
mentioned.
The court carefully avoided making any ruling on such a general
proposition. Instead, it confined its comments to the case of motor vehicle
accidents where the presence and structure of compulsory insurance pursuant
to a statutory scheme presented powerful policy reasons as to why there
should be liability imposed on the mother. The court said, "[t]here are,
however, different policy considerations which arise in the context of a claim
based on negligent driving and those which may arise, for instance, in a claim
based on the mother's taking of unjustified risks of physical injury."'1 19
The prospect of a general duty of care owed by pregnant women to their
unborn children has been criticised strongly in academic commentary 120 and
rejected firmly by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dobson v. Dobson.121
There the Court said that liability was a matter for the legislature to
115. Australian Sports Commission, PREGNANCY, SPORT AND THE LAW 6 (1996); see also Tracy
Molloy & Maria Shand, The Coach and the Female Athlete, Aug. 26, 1998, at 25 (paper presented at
the 8 1h Annual ANZSLA Conference); John Mullins, Sports Law: The Answers to Some of Your
Questions .... 4 SWEAT 23 (1999) (containing other examples of comments suggestive of a similar
conclusion).
116. Lynch, 25 N.S.W.L.R. at 411.
117. Id. at414.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 415.
120. Fiona Forsyth, Note, Lynch v. Lynch & Anor, 18 MELB. U. L. REV. 950, 955 (1992).
121. [1999] 2 S.C.R'. 753; Ian Malkin, Comment, A Mother's Duty of Care to Her Foetus While
Driving: A Comment on Dobson v Dobson (and Lynch v Lynch), 9 TORTS L.J. 109; see also
Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (I1. 1988).
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determine. 122 Fear of the invasive effects on the privacy and lifestyle of
pregnant women that a general duty would herald, together with the difficulty
of determining appropriate standards of behaviour during pregnancy, are
arguments often raised against a duty's existence. Furthermore, in another
context, there is strong authority for parents possessing immunity from suit at
the instance of their children in relation to the children's supervision. 123 A
factor influencing that immunity was the practical difficulty of obtaining
liability insurance, and presumably that would apply with equal force to the
present case.
Thus, whether a pregnant athlete in Australia owes her unborn child a duty
of care under the tort of negligence remains an open and controversial issue.
5. PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING DRUGS
Drugs in sport is the "hot" topic among medico-legal issues in sport. Many
controversies occur and recur. They include:
* the nature of the offences and whether they should reflect strict or
absolute liability;
* the possible criminalisation of the use of drugs such as anabolic
steroids;
* the extension of sport's anti-drug rules to encompass non-
performance-enhancing drugs like marijuana;
* whether the identity of athletes who have tested positive but are yet
to face disciplinary proceedings should be publicised (this can be
especially poignant if the positive test is caused by a prescription
drug required to treat an embarrassing medical disorder);
* deciding when a test to prove the presence of a prohibited drug is
sufficiently reliable to withstand legal challenge; and
" the length of bans imposed as penalties (whether fixed, uniform
penalties lead to unequal treatment for professional compared with
amateur athletes).
This article will consider another issue. It involves the athlete who claims to
require a prohibited performance-enhancing drug for a bona fide therapeutic
purpose. There is considerable support for the view that where the claim can be
proven, the drug ought to be permitted.
122. Also, the English Law Commission recommended that "as a general rule, legislation should
specifically exclude any right of action by a child against its own mother for pre-natal injury."
English Law Commission, REPORT ON INJURIES TO UNBORN CHILDREN (No. 60) 25 (1974). This
was implemented by the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liabilities) Act, 1976, c. 28 (Eng.).
123. Robertson v. Swincer (1989) 52 S.A.S.R. 356.
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The position of asthmatics has long been the focus of attention in this
regard. A number of asthma treatments are prohibited performance-enhancers
(either as respiratory stimulants or anabolic, muscle-building agents), but the
problem this might represent has been solved by identifying treatments that
under particular prescription and method of administration do not deliver
prohibited performance-enhancing effects. However, there are other medical
conditions that present more complex problems.
Australian sporting authorities have been prominent internationally in
working towards the solution of those problems. In 1992, the Australian
Sports Commission established a Medical Advisory Panel ("MAP") which,
among other things, gave advice about approval of the use of prohibited drugs
for therapeutic purposes. In particular, it developed guideline principles for
deciding when a use is for a therapeutic purpose. Broadly, these were that:
* the otherwise prohibited substance was an appropriate treatment for
the athlete's condition;
• there was no alternative treatment which would not be prohibited
under the anti-doping rules;
* the athlete would suffer if denied the treatment; and
" the treatment did not have a performance-enhancing effect other
than to return the athlete to "normal."
The MAP commenced to grant athletes approval for "therapeutic use" from
1992.124 However, this was of no meaningful benefit unless the anti-doping
rules of the athlete's sport recognised that therapeutic use was valid.
Even if those rules did so, further difficulty could arise if the athlete was
tested by the Australian Sports Drug Agency ("ASDA"). Under its governing
legislation, 2 5 ASDA was required to make an entry in the Register of Notifiable
Events (in layman's terms, a positive test) notwithstanding that therapeutic
approval had been given. This was undesirable because in some circles an entry
of a person's name in the Register was mistakenly equated with guilt and the
athlete concerned risked opprobrium notwithstanding no offence was
committed. Rather, a positive test and an entry in the Register are only
necessary conditions for a breach of a sport's anti-doping rules and it is for the
sport's disciplinary processes, not ASDA, to determine whether a breach has
occurred.
Remedy came in the form of the Australian Sports Drug Agency
Amendment Act 1999, which was proclaimed into force on August 1, 1999.
124. Email from Professor Ken Fitch, former member of the Medical Advisory Panel (MAP)
(May 1, 2001).
125. Australian Sports Drug Agency Act, 1990, (Austl.) (hereinafter "ASDA Act").
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The Australian Sports Drug Medical Advisory Committee ("ASDMAC") was
established 126 to replace the MAP and operates under the umbrella of ASDA
rather than the Australian Sports Commission. This change in administrative
"location" for the therapeutic approval function may be seen as consistent with
government policy of separating the "sporting achievement" role of the
Commission (which houses the Australian Institute of Sport) from the "drugs
watchdog" role of ASDA.
A person cannot be appointed to the ASDMAC unless she or he is a
registered medical practitioner and has knowledge of or experience in certain
relevant fields of medical science. 127 It seems unnecessarily limiting that the
membership is confined to registered medical practitioners. This excludes
people lacking that particular qualification who may be even more highly
qualified in the relevant fields of medical science.128
Under the new legislative arrangements, once an athlete has tested positive
to a prohibited drug, ASDA must enter his or her name and other particulars in
the Register of Notifiable Events if certain conditions apply. 129 However,
notwithstanding some rather convoluted legislative provisions, it would seem
that the legislative intent is that ASDA must not do so if the athlete had
therapeutic approval from the ASDMAC and complied with any specified
conditions.
It has been Australian government policy to encourage Australian sport
governing bodies to penalise the use of performance-enhancing drugs and to
carry out drug testing both in and out of competition. It has also been
government policy to have ASDA conduct the tests. Thus, in practice, an entry
in the Register of Notifiable Events by ASDA becomes the key piece of
evidence in any disciplinary proceeding against an athlete. However, it is the
sport governing body that frames the anti-doping rules and has charge of the
conduct of disciplinary proceedings. The need for the ASDA legislation and the
anti-doping rules of the various sports to work in harmony is apparent.
An assumption behind the ASDA legislation is that sport governing bodies
will confer on the ASDMAC the task of approving otherwise prohibited drugs
for therapeutic purposes. Encouraged by government policy, it is now relatively
commonplace for them to do so. For instance, Clause 4 of the 2000/2001
126. Id. § 65B.
127. Id. § 65B(2).
128. Some support for viewing this as an unnecessary limitation is found in the circumstance that
the ASDMAC has needed to establish "a group of experts/consultants to provide specialist advice to
ASDMAC in its deliberations." ASDMAC Annual Report 2000, available at
http://www.asda.org.au/Asdmac/asdmac-new.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
129. Australian Sports Drug Agency Regulations, 1999, Reg. § 29(l)-(2) (Austi.); see also Reg.
§ 30.
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playing season's edition of the Anti-Doping Policy of the Australian Cricket
Board states:
4.1 A player commits a doping offence if:
(a) a prohibited substance is present within the player's body tissue or
fluids, unless:
(i) the player uses the prohibited substance for a therapeutic
purpose (see clause 4.4)
4.4 A player uses a prohibited substance for a therapeutic purpose if:
(a) the player received written approval from ASDMAC, prior to the
testing, for the use of that prohibited substance for a therapeutic
purpose; and
(b) the player has complied with the relevant conditions applicable to
that use.
4.6 The onus of proof is on the player who claims that:
(a) he used a prohibited substance for a therapeutic purpose.130
The manner in which ASDMAC might go about granting any such approval
is not set out in the amending Act, but it may be prescribed by the
Regulations. 13 1  While to date the Regulations do not make any relevant
provision for the factors to be considered in granting approvals to use prohibited
drugs for therapeutic purposes, the practice of ASDMAC encompasses the
guideline principles developed by the MAP. 132
The ASDMAC has, however, stated that it will not grant therapeutic
approvals if either the international or the national governing body for the
athlete's sport does not recognise therapeutic use of drugs. 133 This position may
be seen as the practical approach and one ensuring an element of harmony in the
maze of overlapping rules that constitute the international anti-doping regime.
There are many possible permutations that could present difficulty if
arrangements were otherwise. A case likely to occur would be where an athlete
received approval from the ASDMAC only to be tested at an international event
overseas and disqualified because the sport's international body did not accord
recognition of therapeutic use. This could even lead to the disqualification of a
130. Australian Cricket Board 2000/2001 Anti-Doping Policy, Cl. 4.
131. ASDA Act § 65E(l)(a).
132. Interview with ASDMAC (Apr. 27& Apr. 30, 2001).
133. ASDMAC Role at http://www.asda.org.au/Asdmac/asdmacrole.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2002).
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whole team of other innocent athletes as in, say, an athletics relay or rowing
event.
The note of discord that is sounded by this approach is that athletes with
similar medical conditions requiring treatment with prohibited drugs will be
dealt with differently depending on the stand taken by their sports' national or
international governing bodies. While most Australian national governing
bodies now allow for therapeutic approval, the still significant level of non-
recognition at the international level serves to limit ASDMAC's effective role.
There is a further and important dimension to therapeutic approval of
performance-enhancing drugs; namely, anti-discrimination law. To return to
the Disability Act, section 28(1) provides that "it is unlawful for a person to
discriminate against another person on the ground of the other person's
disability... by excluding that other person from a sporting activity."'
34
One of the meanings of "disability" in section 4 is "(e) the malfunction...
of a part of a person's body."'135 If an athlete required a prohibited
performance-enhancing drug to treat such'a malfunction, the banning of that
drug raises issues of disability discrimination.
It may be that such a ban does not represent direct discrimination against
the athlete because of his or her disability since the ban is aimed at the drug
and not the disability and the ban applies to all athletes. 136 However, the
prospect of indirect discrimination is raised because the athlete is asked to
"comply with a requirement or condition.., with which a substantially higher
proportion of persons without the disability.., are able to comply... and...
with which the ... [athlete] ... is not able to comply."' 137 Nevertheless, there
will be no discrimination if the requirement or condition is "reasonable having
regard to the circumstances of the case."138
There will be cases where an athlete requires an otherwise prohibited
performance-enhancing drug to overcome a bodily malfunction and to
maintain his or her health at a "normal" level. Cases in recent years involving
Australian Football League player Alastair Lynch 139 and National Rugby
134. Disability Act § 28(1).
135. Id. § 4(e).
136. Id. § 5(1).
137. Id. § 6.
138. Id. § 6(b).
139. Lynch admitted to taking a banned anabolic agent, DHEA, but claimed that he required it to
recover from chronic fatigue syndrome. Lynch was charged by the Australian Football League but
acquitted by its Tribunal when it was accepted that he had acted innocently on advice rendered to
him. Tom Salom, I'm No Cheat, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), May 26, 1998, at 30. Lynch's legal
advisor threatened anti-discrimination proceedings if Lynch was not permitted to take the banned
drug. Bruce Matthews, Lion Needs Banned Drug to Play On, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), May 26,
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League player Adam MacDougal1140 may fall into this category. If there was
no alternative effective therapy not prohibited under the anti-doping rules, it
would be unreasonable and therefore discriminatory for a sports body to
require the athlete not to take the drug.
There are two lessons for Australian sport from the foregoing. First, a
sport which does not adopt a therapeutic approval process using the
ASDMAC, or something similar, risks breaching the Disability Act or
corresponding state legislation. Any athlete who takes a therapeutically
necessary drug in the above circumstances and is punished by exclusion from
the sport is likely to be successful in a disability discrimination claim.
Second, disability discrimination is likely to occur if an Australian sports
body enforces an international ban against an athlete who can show that he or
she requires a prohibited drug for therapeutic purposes. The athlete might be
an Australian or a visiting foreigner. This is another instance of the now
familiar circumstance of a clash between the rules of international sports
bodies and the laws of nation states.
6. SEX STATUS
Most sports offer separate competitions for men and women. The primary
reason for doing so is the musculoskeletal differences between them that affect
sporting performance. For many competitive sports, on average, men possess
significant advantages in physical size and strength. The major source of these
differences is found in the role played by the male hormone testosterone.
Many multi-sport events, such as the Olympic Games and the
Commonwealth Games, as well as individual sports, have required
competitors participating in elite women's events to prove they are women by
undergoing a "sex test"--a process described as "gender verification," or
even "femininity control."' 141 The purpose of gender verification has been to
prevent men impersonating or masquerading as women from competing.
Following mounting protest from medical circles, 142 athletes, and other
1998, at 77.
140. In July 1998, it was reported that ASDA had detected an elevated
testosterone/epitestosterone level in a test that it had conducted on a sample donated by MacDougall.
Such a result can be consistent with the prohibited administration of testosterone. MacDougall
claimed that the result was caused by medication that "he must take to treat a rare condition called
hyper-pituitarism, resulting from a blood clot on his brain which nearly killed him two years ago."
I'll Be Cleared: Accused, THE AUSTRALIAN, July 17, 1998, at 20. The National Rugby League
judiciary nevertheless suspended MacDougall for twenty-two weeks. However, upon his return to
play he was permitted to continue taking the medication.
141. Int'l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter, July 1992, Rule 48, Bylaw 2.2.
142. Joan Stephenson, Female Olympians'Sex Tests Outmoded, 276 JAMA 177, 177 (1996); see
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interested groups, 143 the International Olympic Committee abandoned mass
screening of competitors in women's events for at least the Olympic Games in
Sydney in 2000,144 but with the prospect of ad hoc tests if considered
warranted.
Gender verification procedures were first introduced in 1966,145 and initial
attempts to determine the sex of female competitors have been described as
"crude,"'146 an "ordeal for many women," 147 and "degrading."' 148 These
included requiring athletes to parade nude before a panel of physicians and
even direct gynecologic examination. 149 The Olympic Games in 1968 saw the
introduction of a buccal smear for the chromosomes that determine sex. 150
While almost all people who submitted to the test were proved to be female,
the test was widely discredited by the mid-i 970s because of its limited ability
to deal with people who possessed various chromosomal disorders which
could lead them to be described as "intersex." Put simply, some "men" could
pass the test and some "women" could fail depending on the nature and extent
of various disorders. 151 For the 1992 Olympic .Games a variant test was
introduced.152 However, even this measure proved to have its limitations. At
the Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996, out of 3387 female competitors
required to undergo gender verification, 8 were unable to pass this test but
also Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith, Gender Verification and the Place of XY Females in Sport, in
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF SPORTS MEDICINE 360-364 (Mark Harries et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998).
143. E.g., Resolution of the 1 st International Olympic Committee World Conference on Women
in Sport, 1996, available at http://www.olympic.org/ioc/e/org/women%5Fconf2000/
women%5Fconfb/o5F1996resol%5Fe.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002) (which urged "the IOC to
discontinue the current process of gender verification during the Olympic Games").
144. Myron Genel, Gender Verification No More?, 5 MEDSCAPE WOMEN'S HEALTH 1 (2002),
available at http://www.medscape.com/medscape/WomensHealth/journal/2000/v05.n03/
wh7218.gene/wh7218.gene.html. The International Amateur Athletic Federation, the governing body
for the sport of track and field, ceased formal sex testing in 1992. Joe L. Simpson et al., Gender
Verification in Competitive Sports, 16 SPORTS MED. 305 (1993); see also Ferguson-Smith, supra note
142, at 363.
145. Arne Ljungqvist & Joe L. Simpson, Medical Examination for Health of All Athletes
Replacing the Need for Gender Verification in International Sports, 267 JAMA 850, 850 (1992).
146. Genel, supra note 144, at 2.
147. R. J. Carbon, The Female Athlete, in SCIENCE AND MEDICINE IN SPORT 528, 544 (John
Bloomfield et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
148. Stephenson, supra note 142, at 177.
149. Ljungqvist & Simpson, supra note 145.
150. Conducted on buccal epithelial cells obtained by scrapping the buccal mucous membrane
located on the inside of the mouth. Id; see also Carbon, supra note 147, at 544.
151. Ljungqvist & Simpson, supra note 145, at 850.
152. This was the polymerase chain reaction test that "detected the SRY locus of the Y
chromosome, which is the DNA sequence for testes and.., positive for men." Carbon, supra note
147, at 545.
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were allowed to compete following further examination. 153 In particular,
seven of them possessed a disorder (androgen insensitivity syndrome) that
involves unresponsiveness to testosterone produced by "intra-abdominal
atrophic testes." 154 Notwithstanding having male chromosomes, people with
this disorder have a female physical form, especially in terms of external
genitalia, and muscularity and stature within normal female ranges.
Whether the sex test had come to serve any useful purpose to prevent
impersonation was highly questionable. The modem era of close-fitting,
revealing clothing as well as widespread drug tests (in which a chaperone must
witness the urine sample exit the athlete's body) made outright impersonation
virtually impossible. Tests at the Olympic Games and in other quarters have
been conducted with considerable confidentiality and so it is not known for
sure whether the tests ever detected a real imposter, 155 although they may have
acted as a deterrent in the early years. The circumstances that the tests were
discriminatory in the sense that only women had to undergo them, and quite
absurd in the case of athletes who had borne children, served to reinforce the
inappropriateness of "gender verification" as a blanket measure. The
preferable approach came to be seen as investigating and testing if there was
reasonable ground for suspicion that an athlete was not eligible to compete in
women's events, and in substance that is the approach which appears to
prevail for the time being.
Much of the history of gender verification in sport has been as a source of
profound difficulty for those individuals who are not unequivocally of one or
the other sex, rather than as a barrier to the impersonator. In theory at least,
the apparent demise of sex testing as a mass measure does not remove this
difficulty because there remains an eligibility requirement that women's
events are for women only. If the sex status of an intersex athlete is
questioned, it might be expected that the relevant authorities in a sport would
resort to the tests used previously. Those concentrated upon the performance-
enhancing characteristics of testosterone as the means for distinguishing men
and women. Current or historical 156 exposure to testosterone is regarded as
the determinant although the method of testing has evolved and changed since
153. Louis J. Elsas et al., The Centennial Olympic Games, 86 J. MED. ASS'N GA. 50, 52 (1997);
see also Ferguson-Smith, supra note 142, at 363-64 (demonstrating that this proportion is broadly
consistent with the experience of earlier Olympic Games from which results are available).
154. Carbon, supra note 147, at 546.
155. Insiders claim that no imposter has ever been detected. Ferguson-Smith, supra note 142, at
365.
156. Exposure to testosterone prior to puberty seems not to matter. This may occur in the case of
a person of indeterminate sex who undergoes male to female sex re-assignment surgery prior to
puberty. Id. at 361.
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1966. However, this approach has been criticised in the medical literature as
too narrow and that, in the case of intersex athletes, the sex of rearing should
be determinative. 157
Making the testosterone factor the pivotal consideration in determining a
person's sex is not necessarily an approach that would withstand legal
challenge in Australia. 158 The issue of determination of an individual's sex
has received increasing legal attention over the past three decades. People
who have undergone sex realignment surgery have presented significant new
challenges for the law. Transsexuals have come before the courts in a variety
of contexts such as the validity of marriages, entitlement to social welfare, and
in respect of criminal offences where the victim or offender must be of a
particular sex (such as rape). 15 9 The approaches developed in cases concerning
transsexuals might be expected to inform any decision involving an intersex
athlete. Courts have looked to a wide range of factors such as sex of rearing,
lifestyle, psychological sex, and physical appearance. The approach of
Australian courts 160 has tended to be more liberal than that of English
courts 161 in this regard, 162 although an authoritative Australian pronouncement
is yet to be made. Given the international nature of sports competition, there
is the possibility of conflict of laws-the law of the place of a sports event, the
law of the athlete's domicile, and the law of the international sports body
sponsoring the event may make different provisions for determining the
athlete's sex.
Furthermore, the status of transsexual women competing in women's sport
157. Id. at361-62.
158. The focus of the present argument is whether legal principles governing determination of a
person's sex status could sustain a challenge to such an approach. Perhaps a challenge could be
mounted upon an alternative basis; namely, that an intersex person suffers from a disability (a
malformation of part of the body) and is discriminated against on the ground of that disability. This is
an argument that is raised as a possibility and may well involve similar considerations as a challenge
based on sex status principles, but it will not be explored here.
159. See, e.g., Andrew N. Sharpe, Attempting the "Impossible ": The Case of Transsexual Rape,
21 CRIM. L.J. 23 (1997).
160. See, e.g., R v. Harris (1988) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 158 (especially the judgment of Judge
Mathews); R v. Cogley (1989) V.R. 799, 805 (where the court said, "[t]here is, in our view, no legal
test that can be applied to the question whether a person is a man or a woman in a particular context."
It went on to say the question was one of fact to be decided in the circumstances). But see Attorney-
Gen. v. Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603 (where the court also displayed a liberal
approach but regarded the question as one of law). In Kevin v. Attorney-Gen., a marriage between a
woman and a transsexual man was held to be valid, although that ruling is under appeal. (2001) 165
F.L.R. 404.
161. Corbett v. Corbett [1971] P. 83.
162. See also John Mountbatten, Priscilla's Revenge: Or the Strange Case of Transsexual Law
Reform in Victoria, 20 MELB. U. L. REV. 871(1996) (especially the references cited at n.l0).
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has proven controversial. American tennis player Renee Richards (formerly
Richard Raskin) attracted much media interest in the late 1970s and was
successful in legal proceedings to prevent her exclusion from the U.S.
Open. 163 In Australia, in recent years, at least five transsexual women
participated in women's sport and attracted public attention-one in athletics
in New South Wales, two in golf and one in hockey in South Australia, and
one in triathlon in Western Australia.
The expression "transsexual woman" is used here to describe a genetic
male who has undergone sex realignment surgery to bring her physical sex
into accord (as nearly as possible) with her psychological sex. The concern in
sports circles is that transsexual women may have an "unfair" advantage over
other women because of the historical influence of testosterone upon physical
development.
Apart from Richards' case, the common law is yet to directly confront the
issue of transsexual women in sport. In Otahuhu,164 the New Zealand High
Court was concerned with whether a post-operative transsexual woman could
marry a man and concluded that a marriage in those circumstances was
valid. 165 It went on to adopt and reproduce in the judgment a modified version
of the brief of an amicus curiae which dealt with a wider range of issues
concerning the legal status of transsexuals, including their participation in
sport. The brief said in part:
It is submitted that the decision in Richards is wrong, in that in this
kind of circumstance, a male to female transsexual may have a
competitive advantage over other females. That advantage may not be
absolute, as other factors apart from sex, such as skill, will also be
relevant. Nevertheless, the issue in such a situation is very different,
from a social policy point of view, from the issue of marriage. The
professional tennis player who is a male to female transsexual is in a
position potentially to disadvantage all other women professional
tennis players by depriving them of potential earnings and prize
money. Marriage is a private contract between two individuals
without the potential for disadvantaging other persons not party to that
contract. 166
If this approach were to prevail, the curious result would be that for some
purposes a post-operative transsexual would be of one sex and for other
163. Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
164. 1 N.Z.L.R. 603.
165. See also Kevin, 165 F.L.R. 404. Contra Corbett [1973] P. 83; In the Marriage of C and D
(falsely called C) (1979) 28 A.L.R. 524.
166. Otahuhu, 1 N.Z.L.R 603 at 617.
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purposes the opposite sex. Also, it is worth noting that this extract makes
express mention of social policy, the circumstance of factors other than sex
affecting sporting performance, concern about male to female transsexuals
obtaining an advantage, and advantage being rewarded financially at the
expense of other competitors.
This unresolved position at common law is to a degree solved, but also
greatly complicated, by state and territory legislation. Most Australian
jurisdictions now prohibit discrimination on the basis of transsexuality: 16
7
New South Wales ("NSW"),168 Victoria, 169 South Australia,170 Western
Australia, 171 Tasmania, 172 the Australian Capital Territory, 173 and the
Northern Territory. 174 Some of these jurisdictions have gone further and
accord legal recognition to a "change of sex." The New South Wales
legislation is perhaps the most far-reaching in this respect and makes provision
for many of the legal obstacles facing transsexuals to be rectified or removed;
for example, identification of sex on birth certificates. 175 In Tasmania, 176 the
Australian Capital Territory, 177 and the Northern Territory, 178 the result is
similar: A transsexual person's birth record can be amended and a fresh birth
certificate issued. In South Australia and Western Australia, a different
procedure is followed. A certificate can be issued which formally recognises
167. In New South Wales and Victoria the legislation extends to people who are intersex, and in
Western Australia the legislation applies only to post-operative transsexuals rather than including
people in a state of transition as is the case in the other states and territories.
168. Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, pt. 3A.
169. Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, pt. 3 (prohibits discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, the
attribute "gender identity" which is defined in section 6 to include transsexuality).
170. Equal Opportunity Act, 1984, pt. III (S. AUSTL. STAT.) (prohibits discrimination on the
basis of, inter alia, "sexuality" which is defined in section 5(1) to include "transsexuality").
171. Equal Opportunity Act, 1984, pt. IIAA (W. AuSTL. REPR. ACTS).
172. Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 16 (TAS. STAT.) (prohibits discrimination on the grounds
of "(c) sexual orientation" which is defined in section 3 as including "transsexuality").
173. Discrimination Act, 1991, pt. III (AUSTL. CAP. TERR. LAWS) (prohibits discrimination on
the basis of, inter alia, the attribute transsexuality); see also §§ 4(1) ("transsexual"), 7(l)(c)
("transsexuality").
174. Anti-Discrimination Act, 1992, pt. 3 (N. Terr. Austl. Laws) (which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of, inter alia, the attribute "sexuality" which is defined in section 4(1) to include
"transsexuality").
175. Deborah Healey, Exemption for Sport in NSW Transgender Legislation, ANZSLA
NEWSLETTER, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996, at 3.
176. Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act of 1999 (Tas) Pt. 4A, at
http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au/summarize /s/1/?ACTTITLE=%22BIRTHS,%20DEATHS%20AND%
20 MARRIAGES%20REGISTRATION%20ACT%201999%20(NO.%2058%20IF%201999)%22.
177. Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1997, §§ 24-29 (AUSTL. CAP. TERR. LAWS).
178. Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1996, §§ 28A-28J (N. Ter. Austl. Laws).
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the person's re-aligned sex. 179 Overall, the resulting position is limited in
scope and in need of a nationally co-ordinated approach. For example, in
NSW, a person must have been born in the jurisdiction to obtain an amended
birth certificate, and so the legislation is of no benefit to long-term NSW
residents who have undergone surgery in NSW but were born elsewhere.
If the common law regards the post-operative transsexual female athlete as
female, which is possible but untested, then she cannot be accused of being
male and excluded under the various legislative provisions that permit single
sex sports. However, attempts to exclude her on the ground of transsexuality
would have the following consequences. In Victoria, although discrimination
against transsexuals is prohibited generally, the sport body could exclude her
by relying on a specific legislative exemption (see below) notwithstanding her
female sex. In Queensland, where discrimination on the basis of
transsexuality is not prohibited, a sport's governing body would have to make
a rule excluding transsexual .women, from women's events, otherwise they
could compete as women. If the common law regarded transsexual women as
men, they would not be able to compete in women's events in Victoria,
Queensland, and Tasmania.
In South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern
Territory, if the female transsexual athlete has been able to acquire the legal
status of a woman under legislation, the common law is irrelevant and she is
qualified to compete in women's sport. Furthermore, she cannot be excluded
from women's sport on the basis of her transsexuality because that amounts to
unlawful discrimination. If, however, she has not taken, or has been unable to
take, advantage of the legislation, she would be unable to compete as a woman
if the common law regarded her as male. If the common law regarded her as
female, she could not be excluded from women's sport.
The position in New South Wales and Western Australia is the same as in
South Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern
Territory except that the relevant legislation provides a sport-related exception
from the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of transsexuality.
Victoria also provides an exception (see above). The exceptions apply only to
participation, not to ancillary activities like administration, coaching, and
umpiring. None of the three exceptions are self-executing; the sport body
must exclude the transsexual. It is that discriminatory action which may be
protected. Otherwise, the terms of all three exceptions differ markedly. All
are of recent origin.180 The New South Wales exception exhibits the least
179. Sexual Reassignment Act, 1988, (S. AUST. STAT.); Gender Reassignment Act, 2000, (W.
AUSTL. REPR. ACTS).
180. Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and Other Acts Amendment) Act, 1996, (N.S.W. ACTS);
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understanding of the position of transsexuals in sport; the Western Australian
exception exhibits the most understanding.
In making an assessment of these exceptions, it should be borne in mind
that the general policy of the anti-discrimination and equal opportunity
legislation in relation to transsexuals is to outlaw discrimination against them
and to promote their integration into the community, especially in the case of
those who have undergone sex realignment surgery. Any reason to depart
from this policy ought to be a powerful one. The Otahuhu case focuses on
competitive advantage, and this reflects the approach of Olympic Games'
medical authorities in dealing with athletes who are intersex.18 1
Section 38P of the Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, permits "the exclusion
of a transgender person' from participation in any sporting activity for
members of the sex with which the transgender person identifies." 182 A
"transgender person," as defined in section 38A of the Act, includes people
who are of indeterminate sex, post-operative transsexuals, and pre-operative
transsexuals in transition. 183
However, the NSW exception is too wide in that it would permit the
exclusion of:
• female to male transsexuals from men's sport (even though they
may be at a disadvantage in strength);
* male to female transsexuals from those women's sports where any
possible historical advantage from testosterone exposure is
irrelevant, such as in lawn bowls and shooting; 184
* male to female transsexuals from "sporting activity," such as a
round of golf, game of tennis, weight training, swimming in a pool
or running around an athletics track where no formal competition
occurs; and
* certain categories of intersex people from women's sport that,
according to informed medical opinion (see above), should be
allowed to participate.
Furthermore, the NSW exception pays no attention to whether the
Equal Opportunity (Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation) Act, 2000, (VICT. STAT.); and Gender
Reassignment Act, 2000, (W. Ausm. REPR. ACTS).
181. Andrew Sharpe, Naturalising Sex Difference Through Sport: An Examination of the New
South Wales Transgender Legislation, 22 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 40 (1997) (discussing an alternative
approach which questions the male/female divide and advocates division based on physical attributes
that affect performance).
182. Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 38P.
183. Id. § 38A.
184. JOHN CLARKE & ROSS STEVENSON, THE GAMES 91-97 (1999) (a humorous scenario in this
regard).
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individual does in fact possess any relevant advantage over other participants.
Importantly, the Otahuhu case noted the role of skill as a determinant of
sporting success (although not conclusively). 185  Also, it should not be
forgotten that there are many genetic factors that influence athletic
performance (compare the different physiques of elite female netballers and
artistic gymnasts). One genetic factor-historical exposure to testosterone-
among many may not be of sufficient importance in any individual case to
warrant a person's exclusion and a departure from the primary policy of the
legislation.
The Victorian exception avoids some of these problems. The Equal
Opportunity Act, 1995, section 66(1) permits the exclusion of people "with a
gender identity from participating in a competitive sporting activity in which
the strength, stamina or physique of competitors is relevant.' ' 186 "Gender
identity," as defined in section 4 of the Act, includes people who are of
indeterminate sex, post-operative transsexuals, and pre-operative transsexuals
in transition. 187 A "competitive sporting activity" is defined in section 64 as
not including the "non-competitive practice of a sport." 188  Hence,
transsexuals could not be excluded from competitive lawn bowls or shooting,
or from the practice of any sporting activity that was non-competitive in
nature.
It is problematic whether the exception would prevent the exclusion of
female to male transsexuals from men's competitive sport like football, tennis,
or golf where strength at least is relevant. Even though the female to male
transsexual will on average be at a disadvantage, a literal reading of the
exception might suggest that because strength is relevant in the sporting
activity, exclusion is lawful. Also, the Victorian exception looks only to the
generic position in each sporting activity and not to whether the particular
transsexual or intersex person's medical history in relation to testosterone
accords any advantage in the circumstances leading to exclusion.
The Western Australian exception displays the most enlightened approach.
Opportunity Act, 1984 provides:
35AP. Discrimination in sport on gender history grounds
(1) It is unlawful for a person to discriminate against a gender
reassigned person on gender history grounds by excluding that person
from -
185. Otahuhu, 1 N.Z.L.R. 603.
186. Equal Opportunity Act, 1995, § 66(1).
187. Id. § 4.
188. Id. § 64(d).
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(a) a sporting activity; or
(b) an administrative, coaching, refereeing or umpiring activity in
relation to any sport.
(2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply to discrimination against a gender
reassigned person if-.
(a) the relevant sporting activity is a competitive sporting activity
for members of the sex with which the person identifies; and
(b) the person would have a significant performance advantage as a
result of his or her medical history. 1
89
Section 35AP permits exclusion where an individual post-operative
transsexual possesses "a significant performance advantage."' 190  This
approach avoids the difficulties identified in the New South Wales and
Victorian legislation. There is, of course, room for argument over what may
be "significant." The Otahuhu case hints at some guidance. 191 When the
stakes are large in terms of earnings and prestige, the small physical
differences that separate winners and losers in the refined atmosphere of elite
sport carry great significance. However, at lower levels of competitive sport
where the many factors separating competitors are more fluid, past exposure to
testosterone may on balance play a poorly defined role in competitive sporting
performance against other participants and should be ignored.
7. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to illustrate the variety, complexity, and importance
of medico-legal issues in sport. Increasingly the field will come to be seen as
a whole rather than as isolated issues. Hopefully this is a start in that
direction.
Many of the legal outcomes are strongly influenced by advances in
medicine and by medical evidence. Greater understanding of the issues on
both the medical and legal sides is needed if effective health and risk
management policies are to be developed for sport. The law's interest in
protecting human rights will at times be seen by sports administrators, and
maybe health professionals, as an irritating obstacle. However, such
protection is an important element of a free and democratic society, and as has
been demonstrated, anti-discrimination law in particular has a growing role to
189. Gender Reassignment Act, 2000, § 35AP.
190. Id. § 35AP(2)(b).
191. Otahuhu, 1 N.Z.L.R. 603.
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play in the medico-legal arena.
